

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM IN YUGOSLAVIA
THE MYTH OF "TITOISM"

CONSULTATION WITH
DR. ALEX N. DRAGNICH

COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
EIGHTY-FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION



SEPTEMBER 15, 1958
(INCLUDING INDEX)

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COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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PUBLIC LAW 601, 79TH CONGRESS

The legislation under which the House Committee on Un-American Activities operates is Public Law 601, 79th Congress [1946], chapter 753, 2d session, which provides:

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, * * **

PART 2—RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

RULE X

SEC. 121. STANDING COMMITTEES

* * * * *

17. Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members.

RULE XI

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES

* * * * *

(g) (1) Committee on Un-American Activities.

(A) Un-American activities.

(2) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (i) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (ii) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (iii) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation.

The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investigation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable.

For the purpose of any such investigation,* the Committee on Un-American Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and to take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person designated by any such chairman or member.

* * * * *

RULE XII

LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT BY STANDING COMMITTEES

SEC. 136. To assist the Congress in appraising the administration of the laws and in developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, each standing committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the Congress by the agencies in the executive branch of the Government.

RULES ADOPTED BY THE 85TH CONGRESS

House Resolution 5, January 3, 1957

RULE X

STANDING COMMITTEES

1. There shall be elected by the House, at the commencement of each Congress,

(q) Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members.

RULE XI

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES

17. Committee on Un-American Activities.

(a) Un-American activities.

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26. To assist the House in appraising the administration of the laws and in developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, each standing committee of the House shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the House by the agencies in the executive branch of the Government.

SYNOPSIS

Tito cannot be expected to move any farther from the Soviet orbit, Dr. Alex N. Dragnich, political scientist of Vanderbilt University, told the House Committee on Un-American Activities in a recent consultation. "Politically, ideologically, psychologically, morally—in all of these ways—Tito and his comrades feel that they are on the side of the Soviet Union. * * * They believe that the future lies with them, that the future means the destruction of liberal democratic countries, and the victory of communism."

Dr. Dragnich stated that events of the last year or two "point to the fact that Tito has constantly tried to come as close as he can to supporting Moscow's positions, even though he has been criticized [by Moscow]." From a practical standpoint, Dr. Dragnich pointed out, Tito could not hope to have Yugoslavia stand alone as the only Communist nation in the world. For this reason, he wants communism preserved in the Soviet Union and its satellites because its overthrow there would eventually mean his own downfall.

Dr. Dragnich, who directed the United States Information Service in Belgrade for 2½ years, rejected the popular conception that a kind of "national" communism exists in Yugoslavia. "Tito," he said, "has always maintained that he is not a nationalist, that they do not have national communism in Yugoslavia." He also asserted that even if a national form of communism were possible, existed in Yugoslavia, or if other Red nations went "Titoist," it would be nothing to cheer about. Even under a real "national" communism the "basic policies would be contrary to everything that we hold dear * * * basic freedoms—free choice of political leaders, free speech and free press, respect for the individual, freedom of religion—all these would be trampled in the dust by Communist tyranny."

Dr. Dragnich emphasized the fact that Tito did not leave the Cominform voluntarily, but was expelled from it against his wishes and that, since his so-called break with the Kremlin, there have been "no fundamental changes in Communist goals, or in the dominant position of the Communist Party" in the Yugoslav dictatorship. While there have been some superficial relaxations in Yugoslavia since Tito's troubles with Moscow—relaxations brought about in part by the resistance of the people to communism—there "certainly is not" any growth of freedom or democracy in Titoland.

Tito is "a most valuable ally and agent of communism," Dr. Dragnich stated, because he "helped international communism when it needed it the most." This was when communism was at its lowest ebb—after Stalin's death and the exposures that followed it. Tito then, by his statements and by his travels, succeeded in convincing many people in the Near, Middle, and Far East that "there could be a different type of communism, a good kind of communism," and that Moscow had really changed under Khrushchev's leadership. This, Dr. Dragnich said, was "a tremendous service" to the Kremlin.

On the subject of United States aid to Tito, the Vanderbilt University political scientist said that there never was a good case for United States military assistance because Tito's army is unreliable. Dr. Dragnich said that while in Yugoslavia he had asked many people there if the army would fight in case of a Soviet or satellite attack, and the general reaction was: "Fight for what? Fight to help retain this tyrant?" or "Yes, we will fight if you assure us that when it is all over with, we, too, can be free."

Economic aid might have been justifiable for a year or two after Tito's expulsion, "until we could see the trend of developments." Because Tito had killed off all opposition, there was no chance of a democratic government emerging. However, Western defenses in Europe were weak at the time; Yugoslavia's ouster from the Cominform was the first significant break in the Soviet empire; and there was a possibility that it might lead to a real split in the Communist camp. For these reasons, "some limited aid was justifiable" at the time.

The question of aid to Tito must be examined from two angles, Dr. Dragnich said—its international effects and its internal effects in Yugoslavia.

As far as the international results are concerned, the United States has succeeded in embarrassing the Soviet Union. Dr. Dragnich questioned, however, the validity of this as a goal of United States foreign policy when it also involved other, and perhaps more important, injurious effects. He pointed out that, on the international level again, United States aid has helped Tito make communism more palatable to many people by creating the illusion that a "respectable" type of communism is possible.

Internally, United States aid to Tito has had a negative effect. It has "tended to kill off any hopes for the realization of freedom for the people." "What hope is there," Yugoslavs said to Dr. Dragnich, "when even you people are helping this tyrant?"

Ninety percent of the Yugoslavian people are opposed to Tito and communism and, if a revolution like that of the Hungarian revolt were to take place, communism would disappear within a few days, Dr. Dragnich believes. The failure of the United States to help the Hungarian freedom fighters when they revolted, however, was "a sad blow" to the people of Yugoslavia and other Eastern European countries. For years this country had held out hope to these people and had indicated, at least indirectly, that they would receive assistance if they ever made a break for freedom. When the Hungarians did so, however, the United States did nothing. This has had a "devastating effect" on the morale of the people of Eastern Europe.

Dr. Dragnich, who has taught political science at Vanderbilt University since 1950, is the author of the book "Tito's Promised Land." From November 1947 to May 1950, he was in charge of the United States Information Service and its library in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. He has also taught at Western Reserve University.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM IN YUGOSLAVIA THE MYTH OF "TITOISM"

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1958

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D. C.

CONSULTATION

The following consultation with Dr. Alex N. Dragnich was held at 1:30 p. m. in room 226 of the Old House Office Building, Washington, D. C.

Committee member present: Representative Francis E. Walter, of Pennsylvania, chairman.

Staff members present: Richard Arens, staff director; Col. William F. Heimlich, consultant; and Francis J. McNamara, research analyst.

The CHAIRMAN. Please rise and be sworn, Dr. Dragnich.

Do you solemnly swear, Dr. Alex N. Dragnich, that the testimony you are about to give in this matter will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. DRAGNICH. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Mr. Arens.

STATEMENT OF DR. ALEX N. DRAGNICH

Mr. ARENS. Dr. Dragnich, will you kindly give us a word respecting your occupation and background.

Dr. DRAGNICH. I was born and reared in the State of Washington. I have a B. A. degree from the University of Washington and M. A. and Ph. D. degrees from the University of California (Berkeley). I specialized in political science.

I spent the war years (1942-45) in Government service here in Washington. After that I taught 2 years at Western Reserve University. Then for 2½ years—that is, between November 1947 and May 1950—I was a Foreign Service Reserve officer in the American Embassy in Belgrade, in charge of the United States Information Service and the American Library there.

I am now professor of political science at Vanderbilt University, where I have been since 1950.

Mr. ARENS. Could you tell us, please, what precipitated your interest over the years in the subject of our consultation, namely, the Communist regime in Yugoslavia?

Dr. DRAGNICH. This is in my professional field of endeavor, but my service in our Embassy there, during the 2½ years I mentioned, served to increase my interest.

I had been in Yugoslavia as a graduate student back in 1939, for a couple of months. I have also had some interest in that country because my own parents came from there.

In 1954 my study of the Tito regime was published in book form, under the title, "Tito's Promised Land."

Mr. ARENS. Would you give us now, please, Doctor, just a thumbnail sketch of the history of the Communist regime in Yugoslavia?

Dr. DRAGNICH. That is a pretty big order. I shall try to be as brief as I can.

The Communist regime in Yugoslavia came into being toward the end of World War II, in no small measure because of Allied war decisions (including the giving of material aid to Tito) and the help of the Soviet Army.

I should like to make one thing clear at this point. Much of the recent writing about Yugoslavia suggests that Tito won power on his own, whereas, in the other Eastern European countries, communism was imposed by the Red army. This distinction is simply not true. Tito, to be sure, had a kind of guerrilla movement within the country, in which he began building the basis for a Communist regime, but it is doubtful that he could have gained power, or that he could have gained it so easily, if it had not been for the fact that the Soviet Army came into Yugoslavia in the fall of 1944 and drove the Germans out of Belgrade and turned the capital of the country over to Tito.

This is one of those myths that has been created partly because of Tito's later difficulties with the Russians. Actually, if it hadn't been for Western aid to Tito and the help from the Russian Army, he probably would never have gotten into power.

Mr. ARENS. Can you give us now a sketch of the highlights of the history of communism within Yugoslavia?

Dr. DRAGNICH. I suppose you would have to say it began in the war years when the Communist movement got going as a result of the Russians coming into the war against the Germans, following the Nazi attack on Russia. The Communist leaders, Tito and others, began building a Communist society in the areas they controlled. Even before the war was over they began seizing factories and other properties. They began shooting opponents.

As you know, there was the guerrilla resistance movement led by Gen. Draza Mihailovich, who was an agent of the Yugoslav government-in-exile at that time, a man who had no other interest than seeking the defeat of the Axis forces. Of course, he and his movement were a thorn in Tito's side. Consequently, the Communists did everything they could to discredit the movement and to get it out of the way, and in this they were quite successful. The West was simply sold a bill of goods.

The policy of aiding Tito and dropping Mihailovich was in large part a policy determined upon by Winston Churchill, a man whom I admire in many ways but a man who nevertheless must, I think, bear before history much of the responsibility for the victory of communism in Yugoslavia.

This is rather ironic, too, because the British policy at that time, with respect to other resistance leaders on the Continent, was to tell them to lie low, husband their resources, and wait for the day of invasion. In the case of Yugoslavia, they expected the exact reverse

of Mihailovich, although Mihailovich knew that attacks against the Germans, at that time, would bring about terrific retribution as far as the population was concerned. The Germans would shoot a hundred hostages for every German soldier that was killed. In such circumstances Mihailovich accepted the general view of the West that he should wait, and not the opposite view of the British.

The Communists, of course, were not willing to wait. They did not care how many innocent people died. They were only interested in proving to the British and to us that they were killing more Germans than Mihailovich, and that we should support them.

The Allied decision to support Tito's movement, I believe, was made at the Teheran Conference. From that time on, the fate of Mihailovich was pretty well sealed.

Mr. ARENS. When did communism actually gain control of Yugoslavia?

Dr. DRAGNICH. October 1944. That is, when the Russian troops "liberated" Belgrade and turned it over to Tito and his comrades. From then on, Tito pushed consolidation of Communist power in Yugoslavia.

Mr. HEIMLICH. What steps did Tito take to effect this consolidation? Were they the classic steps used in Russia and elsewhere?

Dr. DRAGNICH. Pretty much; the ordinary elimination of anybody who might conceivably stand in their way. They first went out and shot, even without the benefit of any trial, those lawyers, judges, doctors, teachers, and others who might have had an anti-Communist record. That is, people that the Communists thought might be the focal point of resistance against them. Those that they did not shoot, the less dangerous ones, they trotted off to jail or to work camps, and sometimes "forgot" about them for years. Those still less dangerous, came under constant secret police surveillance. These were the main techniques.

Mr. ARENS. What is the significance of Yugoslavia between the forces of international communism and the forces of the free world?

Dr. DRAGNICH. We should never forget that Tito and the other Yugoslav Communists are just as opposed to our way of life as are the Russian or Chinese Communists.

In the initial years of the Tito regime, Tito's Yugoslavia was really the most loyal satellite the Soviet Union had. Tito and his comrades were really falling all over themselves to uphold the Soviet position, whether it be in the U. N. or elsewhere.

In spite of all of their troubles with the Russians, the Yugoslav Communists have always tried to point out that their basic aims are the same aims as the Soviet Union's, that is, international communism. They aim, just as any other Communist country, toward the destruction of what they call the bourgeois capitalist system, which means us, primarily, and other parts of the free world.

Mr. ARENS. Does the location, geographically, of Yugoslavia bear any importance on strategic military considerations?

Dr. DRAGNICH. In terms of the kind of strategy people thought about in World War II, it is very important. That is, it borders on the Adriatic Sea. It is accessible as far as Italy is concerned. It is a kind of gateway to the Continent from the Mediterranean. I am not a military expert, but it seems to me that if you had a general atomic war, Yugoslavia would not be strategically important, at

least unless you actually had bases there. But Tito has never been willing to give us anything in terms of landing rights or anything of that kind.

Mr. ARENS. What caused the rupture with Moscow in 1948?

Dr. DRAGNICH. Several things. Certain suspicions between Moscow and Tito arose during the war. Tito and his cohorts didn't receive from the Russians the kind of help that they wanted and needed. Moreover, Stalin urged them to try to get along with Mihailovich and the Yugoslav government-in-exile. These were but two sources of suspicion in their wartime experiences.

At this point, I want to add, as you are no doubt well aware, Stalin, like other Communists, was never satisfied with a person being 90 percent on his side, or 95 percent on his side. No one could differ with him in the least. It had to be 100 percent agreement or a person was not acceptable. And Tito did not always measure up to this standard.

Aside from the war-bred suspicions, the break came about because of two things which demonstrate this. First, the Russians were determined to exploit Yugoslavia economically. They did not want Yugoslavia to industrialize. They wanted her to send raw materials to Russia, or to some other, more industrialized, Communist country. That was one thing.

Secondly, the Soviets wanted to have complete political domination. Tito went along with them 95 percent of the time, but that wasn't enough. They tried to infiltrate the Yugoslav Communist Party, the Yugoslav Army, and the Yugoslav Secret Police. This was resisted by Tito. These were the main reasons that brought about the break in 1948.

It should be added, however, that Tito is not the one who broke with Moscow. Even after all of their difficulties, he kept praising Moscow. It was actually Moscow which excommunicated Tito, i. e., threw him out of the Cominform.

Mr. HEIMLICH. That is to say, Stalin?

Dr. DRAGNICH. Yes.

Mr. ARENS. What is the status of Yugoslavia now within the Red orbit?

Dr. DRAGNICH. One can't be entirely sure. We don't have enough detailed information on exactly what has been happening within the last year or so; but there has been criticism, as you know, of the Yugoslav leaders by Moscow and, upon Moscow's orders, by Communist leaders in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and elsewhere. We are not certain of the basis for this particular criticism. Obviously, there are some differences of opinion, but there is no question of Tito's allegiance to communism.

Mr. ARENS. How would you characterize so-called "national" or "independent" communism within Yugoslavia?

Dr. DRAGNICH. This could best be answered by stating in what ways Yugoslavia has changed since the so-called break with Moscow.

Mr. ARENS. All right, sir.

Dr. DRAGNICH. First of all, there have been no fundamental changes in Communist goals, or in the dominant position of the Communist Party in the dictatorship. These two things are paramount. There has been no change as far as goals are concerned, and no change in the monopoly of power being held by the Communists in the dictatorship.

Now, superficially, there seems to have been some relaxation of the dictatorship. People don't feel quite the same pressure. Also there are a few more goods, a few more consumer goods, very expensive, but more available, partly, I suppose, because of Western aid, primarily American aid.

Agriculture, it seems to me, is the only real difference, because between 1952 and 1953 the Tito regime was simply forced to recognize an intolerable situation in agriculture. Production had gone way down. The peasants were on a kind of sitdown strike, refusing to plant, refusing to harvest, and so on. For the time being at least, Tito and his comrades had to give up collectivization of agriculture.

Mr. HEIMLICH. What caused the resistance of the peasants to the land reform that you have just mentioned?

Dr. DRAGNICH. Well, primarily, their love of the soil. These people are peasants who have been on the soil for years and their ancestors before them. The struggle for a piece of land meant the difference between bread and starvation over the centuries. They will not surrender their land now.

Mr. HEIMLICH. Yugoslavia is largely an agricultural nation, isn't it?

Dr. DRAGNICH. Yes, primarily. It certainly was before the Communists came, with 75 or 80 percent of the people engaged in agriculture.

Mr. HEIMLICH. That would indicate a large part of those, at least, who are the agriculturists, the peasantry, would oppose the very basic tenets of communism, wouldn't it?

Dr. DRAGNICH. That is absolutely right. But here comes a regime now and takes it away from them. Even peasants who still had their piece of land, never felt that it was theirs. Time after time they would say: "I am no longer master here * * *. I can't do what I want with a cow or a calf. I can't sell it without getting permission. I have to plant what they tell me to plant. I can't dispose of my produce the way I want to. They will come around and tell me how much I am supposed to give them. They set the price * * *." Communist agricultural policies go contrary to everything a farmer or peasant believes in.

I should like to add one other thing. I have made brief reference to some changes in Yugoslavia, but this does not mean that there is a growth of freedom or democracy in Yugoslavia. There certainly is not. As late as last spring, they imprisoned two elderly and rather well-known Social Democrats, Alexander Pavlovich and Bogdan Krëkich. At the same time, they imprisoned two well-known university professors, Dragoslav Stranyakovich and Milan Zhujovich. Among other things, a fantastic charge was made against one of these fellows. Allegedly, he had gone to the American Embassy to try to interest the American Embassy in building, or supporting the building of, the Belgrade-Bar Railroad. But back in 1952, when I was in Belgrade, that road was then under construction, with the aid of American funds. Now, this man is accused of wanting to construct a certain project which was actually Tito's project and which we gave money to help construct 6 years ago.

Mr. ARENS. What has been the effect of Tito on Communist developments in the Middle or Far East?

Dr. DRAGNICH. First of all, a good many people in the Middle East, Near East, and Far East, too, who had come to realize the imperialistic nature of Stalinism, were influenced by Tito to believe that there could be a different type of communism, a good kind of communism. Maybe that isn't the best phraseology, but what I am trying to say is that Tito helped international communism when it needed it the most. Moreover, during the trips Tito took to Egypt and India in 1954 and 1955, he tried to sell the notion that Russia under Khrushchev's leadership had really changed.

In this respect, Tito did the Russians a tremendous service. This was the low point of Soviet prestige. This was the time when the nature of the Stalinist foreign policy had been laid bare for everybody to see. Then along comes Tito and argues that after all it was all Stalin's fault, that Russia had now changed. And, all the while, Tito continued, in these years, to uphold the Soviet position on major international questions. He is a most valuable ally and agent of communism.

Mr. ARENS. What has been the effect of the recent events in Hungary on the Government and people of Yugoslavia?

Dr. DRAGNICH. Well, the Hungarian revolution really scared Tito and his Government. Security measures were immediately tightened.

Without going into the question of how the revolution started in Hungary, Tito's own comments were significant when he tried to uphold the Russian intervention by saying it was the lesser of two evils.

He said that the situation had gotten so bad that Communists didn't dare admit to being Communists or else they were hung from the nearest lamp post.

I think he admitted far more than he really wanted to in that statement, showing how unpopular the Communist regime was.

For the Yugoslav people, 90 percent of whom would throw Tito out tomorrow and every kind of communism with him if they could, the Hungarian revolution was a sad blow. We have been telling the peoples in the Eastern European countries not to despair, that one of these days their liberation would come. If they would just hold firm, one of these days they would be free.

Well, here was a feeling, rightly or wrongly, a belief that had been imparted to these peoples that if they just made some move at some key point, they would get help from us and they would be liberated.

Our failure—the failure of our help to materialize when the Hungarian revolution came—went a long way toward killing off the hopes of the Yugoslav people for liberation in the near future.

I am sure it had a very bad effect in every Eastern European country. We have been holding out hopes for the liberation of these people. Here comes a full-scale revolution, overthrows the Communist regime in just a few days. Nothing happens as far as we are concerned.

The Russians march in. We do nothing. Without seeming to advocate any position or point of view, I am convinced that the outcome had a rather devastating effect from the point of view of the morale of the peoples of Eastern Europe.

Mr. ARENS. Can the West expect Yugoslavia to move further away from the Soviet orbit?

Dr. DRAGNICH. I don't think we can expect Yugoslavia to move away from the Soviet orbit. Not appreciably.

The indications of the last year or two point to the fact that Tito has constantly tried to come as close as he can to supporting Moscow's positions, even though he has been criticized.

Politically, ideologically, psychologically, morally—in all of these ways—Tito and his comrades feel that they are on the side of the Soviet Union. They are going in the same general direction.

They believe that the future lies with them, that the future means the destruction of liberal democratic countries, and the victory of communism. From that point of view, it seems to me that Tito would never feel at home close to the West.

Mr. McNAMARA. Is the preservation of communism in the Soviet Union and the satellites essential to Tito's regime?

Mr. DRAGNICH. Yes. I say politically, ideologically, morally, he is on the Soviet side. I cannot envisage the Tito regime or any Communist regime in Yugoslavia staying very long if there were no other centers of world communism, such as the Soviet Union.

Mr. HEIMLICH. It seems to me any discussion of Yugoslavia today must take into consideration the impact of Djilas and his book, *The New Class*.

A little earlier, we discussed the role of Yugoslavia in the Near and Far East. Did the long trip which Djilas made out to the Far East, around 1954, have influence there? And did what he saw have influence on him later?

Dr. DRAGNICH. Well, I think generally his trip served a similar purpose to Tito's trip as far as spreading the notion that communism could be different from the Soviet version.

The influence upon Djilas, himself, in becoming disillusioned with the Communist system, I think, stems more from Djilas' visit to England and perhaps even to this country.

Mr. HEIMLICH. You are well acquainted with his record. What kind of a person is Djilas?

Dr. DRAGNICH. Well, I have never met the man personally. But I have met many people in Yugoslavia whose relatives were shot because of Djilas. He was responsible for countless acts of tyranny. Djilas was one of the most anti-American of all Yugoslav Communists when I was there. In the period of 1947 to 1950, all of his speeches, newspaper articles, and other utterances were full of anti-American propaganda.

If you could talk with a lot of Yugoslavs about what Djilas said in his book, many would no doubt resort to profanity and assert: "Curse him, he is responsible in a large part for what we have here."

While I am sure that the people were glad to see something like the Djilas criticism of the regime, they would not make a hero of him. He was very ruthless during and after the war also. I know that the notion has spread that Djilas is a believer in freedom. I think it is very unfortunate that that notion has spread.

He has written this book. He is being made somewhat of a martyr and believer in freedom, which he is not. According to the best information I have, the book was not written in jail, as has been claimed. It was written before his arrest and it was turned over to a foreign newspaper correspondent, not an American, who carried the manuscript out.

When Djilas was arrested, they found two copies of this manuscript. Of course, they took the copies. But a third copy had already gotten out of the country. I think the information is erroneous that it was written in jail or that it was smuggled out of jail. Moreover Djilas is serving an extra sentence because of that book.

Mr. ARENS. Is a national form of communism, independent of Moscow, possible in Yugoslavia?

Dr. DRAGNICH. I should say that Russia and all other Communist countries are, in a sense, national, in that they have national governments, national armies, national police, and so on. But they all claim to be internationalists, Tito included.

Tito has always maintained that he is not a nationalist, that they do not have national communism in Yugoslavia. They believe in international communism. If Communist power collapsed elsewhere, if it collapsed in the Soviet Union, for example, I do not believe it would last for very long in Yugoslavia.

Let's turn this question around. Let's assume that a nationalist form of communism is possible, or would be possible. I would then say that there would be little or nothing to be cheerful about from the point of view of people believing in freedom and democracy.

There would be very little gain, it seems to me, if various countries of the world went "Titoist." Even if they were run by national Communists, their basic policies would be contrary to everything that we hold dear. That is, basic freedoms—free choice of political leaders, free speech and free press, respect for the individual, freedom of religion—all these would be trampled in the dust by Communist tyranny.

Even if national communism were a possibility, the free world would have little to cheer about.

Mr. ARENS. Should the United States extend further military and economic aid to Yugoslavia?

Dr. DRAGNICH. This is a big question and one with which I have wrestled a good deal.

First of all, we must distinguish between aid in time of disaster and famine to save human lives, and aid of a financial, technical fashion, economic aid, or military aid.

I think most people, most Americans, would support the giving of food to any human being in time of disaster and famine. But this is not what we are talking about.

As we examine this problem, we have to look at it from two angles.

One, what has been the effect of this aid up to date in Yugoslavia? And, two, what has been the effect internationally?

Taking the second one first, Tito's existence has been an embarrassment to the Soviets to this extent:

Our aid has contributed to the discomfort of our enemy. But in another sense our aid has made a certain type of communism, which really does not differ much from the Russian, respectable. It has, in a sense, resulted in Tito doing some service to the Russians by making communism more palatable, by spreading the notion that communism need not be the Soviet variety.

Suppose we embarrass the Soviet Union by our aid to Tito? Is this our only purpose? I do not think we have been clear about this in our country. What is the aim of our aid?

I think Mr. Dulles said some time ago that one of the things we hope to achieve is to pry the other satellites away from Moscow. Following some talks between Dulles and Tito, a statement was issued in which Tito and Mr. Dulles agreed that the Eastern European countries ought to be free and independent, that there should be no interference in the domestic affairs of these countries.

The only trouble with that is that Mr. Dulles was talking about one thing and Tito about another.

Noninterference in the internal affairs of these countries, in Tito's view, means that we should abandon these countries. When he talks of "noninterference," he is saying to us: "Stay away, don't discuss the satellite countries. They are now free and independent countries. We do not want you to interfere in their affairs."

This is the kind of thing that creates difficulties for us when we ask what it is we are trying to accomplish with our aid. Is our aim liberation or a less odious form of communism?

Domestically, within Yugoslavia, our aid has had a negative effect in that it has tended to kill off any hopes for the realization of freedom for the people.

I have had any number of Yugoslavs say to me, "What hope is there, when even you people are helping this tyrant?"

If we are going to talk about continuing our aid, we ought to have some of these questions in mind. I do not think we have given enough attention to them in the past.

I think we ought to do one other thing. We ought to make a clear-cut differentiation between military aid and economic aid.

I do not think there was ever really a good case for military aid. All of my talks, especially in the summer of 1952, with Yugoslavs in all walks of life, led me to the conclusion that, at best, the Tito army would be a very unreliable instrument.

Time and again when I asked people if they thought the army would fight in case of Russian or a satellite attack on Yugoslavia, the general reaction I got was: "Fight for what? Fight to help retain this tyrant?" or "Yes, we will fight if you assure us that when it is all over with, we, too, can be free."

Today, it seems to me, there is even less of a case for military aid. After our failure to come to the aid of the Hungarian revolution against communism, does anyone really think that we would go to the aid of Tito, if he were attacked?

I just do not see that possibility.

Mr. ARENS. Doctor, do you have any further comments you would like to make?

Dr. DRAGNICH. I think I would like to make one other comment with respect to economic aid.

Mr. ARENS. Yes, sir.

Dr. DRAGNICH. I think, initially, when the break between Moscow and Belgrade came, there were reasons why some limited assistance might have been in order.

The Tito regime had by that time pretty well killed off all opposition, so there did not seem to be any possibility of a pro-democratic group taking over in Yugoslavia. On the other hand, there was a very real fear that those Communists who were really thoroughgoing Kremlin agents might take over.

This was the first time that there was any kind of break in the Communist camp. We did not know what would happen. There was a possibility, at least, that this might lead to a real split in the Communist camp, that is, that other Communist countries would break away from Moscow.

For this reason, some limited aid was justifiable until we could see the trend of developments. It was a period when we were rather weak in Western Europe, so that any detracting from the potential of the Communist camp was to our benefit.

But within a year or two, with the shoring up of the Western defenses and with the pretty conclusive evidence that would-be Titos had already been executed, the case for additional aid simply did not exist any more.

One thing that always bothered me about our aid to Tito was this: In no other country that I have been in, did I find people who were more friendly disposed toward the United States than in Yugoslavia. This is especially true among the Serbs. Yet we were giving aid to their bitter enemy. Even that they could take, provided we would give them some good reason why we were doing it.

Tito was doing something of the kind, in reverse, by telling his people: "Well, I am getting aid from the West, sure, but I have not sold out to the West. I am still loyal to Communist goals, et cetera."

I should have wished—I recommended this a number of times—that we tell the Yugoslav people quite frankly in radio broadcasts and otherwise: "Yes, we are giving aid to Tito because this is part of a larger problem of dealing with Soviet expansionism. We are not giving it to him because we like him. We know your aspirations for freedom. We hope one of these days that you, too, will be free."

I think this would have made a big difference to the people of the country who are our real friends, if we could have been just a little more frank in telling them the basis of our policies.

Mr. HEIMLICH. If anything should happen to Marshal Tito, what would likely be the course of events, politically speaking, in Yugoslavia?

Dr. DRAGNICH. Well, I think it would be unfair for me to say that I could tell you with any certainty what would happen.

Mr. HEIMLICH. I understand that, Dr. Dragnich. You have indicated, though, that the army is possibly not loyal to the Communist regime, that a large percentage of the population as represented by the vast peasantry is not in sympathy with the regime, that the regime achieved its power by intervention of the Red army and sustained itself by the execution of its enemies.

There must be countless thousands of relatives and friends of those who died. I am trying to get a pattern of what might happen in a land that is known for its violence if this violent man, himself, should die.

Dr. DRAGNICH. I think a lot depends upon the circumstances. If it were something like the events in Hungary, for example, I am sure that communism would disappear in Yugoslavia within a few days.

If there was a real opportunity, if the people felt there was an opportunity to get rid of the Communists, they would not last long.

Now, if Tito should die, let's say tomorrow, and that simultaneously the Yugoslav Communist Party would announce that Rankovich or

some other Communist leader was now the head, it may very well be that nothing much would happen, because the change would have been made without the people being aware of what was going on.

But in any turbulent situation, there is always the possibility of some civil conflict. This is a thing I do not think we are prepared for.

We were not prepared for it in the case of Hungary. I think we have to make some very basic decisions as a government, have some specific plans made in the eventuality of something like Hungary so we could have a plan which we could put into effect.

MR. McNAMARA. Doctor, will you tell us what you believe would happen if the United States would cut off all aid to Tito?

DR. DRAGNICH. If the United States were to cut off all aid to Tito?

MR. McNAMARA. Do you think it would bring about his collapse?

DR. DRAGNICH. This would have been true, I believe, back in 1951 or 1952.

Under present circumstances, however, maybe not. Our aid has helped the Communists rehabilitate the Yugoslav economy to some extent. They are in a much firmer position now than they were.

If we were to cut off all aid, I think Tito would go along pretty much as he is right now. It would not drive him back to the Russians any more than he wants to go there anyhow.

MR. McNAMARA. Do you believe it would eventually worsen economic conditions in Yugoslavia if we were to cut off aid, and Tito's regime would become more shaky?

DR. DRAGNICH. It is difficult to predict. Some of our aid has gone into projects which have not been particularly productive anyway. Some aid is going into the building of certain basic projects. If we should cut off aid, the regime's difficulties would certainly increase, but the regime may still be able to continue.

I should like to add one final observation, a more optimistic one. The people of Yugoslavia, especially the Serbs, have a deep and abiding faith in freedom. They are not likely to accept a Communist regime for all time to come. Their faith in the United States, although partially shaken, is also firm. Whatever we do, we ought to keep faith with them.

THE CHAIRMAN. Doctor, we thank you for your contribution in this consultation.

DR. DRAGNICH. You are most welcome.

(Whereupon, at 2:25 p. m., Monday, September 15, 1958, the consultation was concluded.)

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